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STERILIZATION: A CONTINUING CONTROVERSY
I
INTRODUCTION: A CASE OF NON-SUPPORT
On October 3, 1963, Miguel Vega Andrade was charged with having
violated Section #270 of the California Penal Code.1 On December 2nd,
Andrade entered a plea of guilty and applied for probation. The case was
called for hearing in the Municipal Court of Pasadena before Judge
Joseph A. Sprankle, Jr. on January 6, 1964. Ten days later, Andrade was
sterile.
Andrade's marriage had ended in divorce and his former wife had
filed a complaint charging him with failing to support their four children.
At the time of this action Andrade was living with another woman who
had borne him one illegitimate child. Andrade's earnings were meager and
the additional expense of this child was part of the reason he had fallen
behind in support payments. Judge Sprankle advised Andrade in cham-
bers (only Andrade, his attorney, and Judge Sprankle were present)
that he would consent to probation if two conditions were fulfilled. These
conditions were: (1) that Andrade marry the woman with whom he was
then living; (2) that Andrade submit to an operation for the prevention
of procreation. The judge allegedly told the defendant that: . . . "you
are either to bring in the certificate of marriage and a letter from the
doctor, or you will go to jail."2 A successful vasectomy was performed on
Andrade on January 16, 1964; he was married on January 24th.
Subsequently, Andrade applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the
California Supreme Court. The petition asked that the court strike that
condition of probation which required sterilization and that it be decreed
that petitioner be authorized to seek further surgery to undo the vasec-
tomy. On November 10, 1964, the state Supreme Court denied, without
opinion, the relief sought.' On February 5, 1965, petition for certiorari
was filed with the United States Supreme Court and on the following
March 29th that petition was denied, also without opinion.'
Even more recently the sterilization controversy flared anew. On April
14, 1966, Mrs. Nancy Hernandez was among sixteen persons arrested in
1 California Penal Code §270 provides in part: "A father of either a legitimate or illegiti-
mate minor child who wilfully omits without lawful excuse to furnish necessary clothing, food,
shelter, or medical attendance or other remedial care for his child is guilty of a misde-
meanor .
2Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, page 3, filed by Andrade's attorney.
3 62 A.C. No. 2: Minutes page 2, San Francisco, November 10, 1964.
4 In re Andrade, 380 U.S. 953 (1965).
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Santa Barbara, California in a crack-down on suspected marijuana users.
At the time she was living with one Joe Sanchez who was not her husband
but who was the father of her second child, then three months old. Mrs.
Hernandez pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charge of being found in a
place where narcotics (marijuana) were being used. Mr. Sanchez was
charged with possession. Municipal Court Judge Frank P. Kearney
offered her probation conditioned upon her sterilization in lieu of a six
month jail term. The judge expressed concern over the well-being of Mrs.
Hernandez's two children and that of any future children she might have.
In the background was the fact that Mrs. Hernandez was receiving
$145.00 a month in county welfare for the support of her two children,
one of whom was illegitimate. This, incidentally, was Mrs. Hernandez's
first offense.
She decided to contest the sterilization order after first agreeing to it.
Consequently, probation was then revoked and she was sentenced to
90 days. However, on June 8, 1966 Mrs. Hernandez was freed by Superior
Court Judge C. Douglas Smith and placed on three years routine proba-
tion. Judge Smith ruled that the lower court had acted arbitrarily and in
excess of its judicial power and further noted that sterilization would
have little effect on the probabilities of Mrs. Hernandez becoming an
addict. It should be noted that the lower court was not without some
precedent. The denial of the writ of habeas corpus in Andrade was an
implicit holding that a sterilization order is within a judge's discretion in
setting probation. It is clear that sterilization was more closely related
to Andrade's crime of failure to support minor children than it was to
Mrs. Hernandez's crime of being in a place where narcotics were used;
moreover, Andrade was seeking court sanction to undo a sterilization
operation and Mrs. Hernandez was seeking to prevent such an operation.
Unfortunately, however, it is not known what weight, if any, was given
to these factors.'
Few people are aware of the extent to which sterilization has been
advocated and practiced in this country. One reason for this is that very
few sterilization cases ever reach the appellate courts, and fewer yet are
factually reported. The facts of the cases mentioned above have never
been reported other than in the press.6
The purpose of discussing the Andrade and Hernandez cases by way
of introduction is to emphasize the two questions with which this study is
5 See, for example, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of a Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus, note 2 supra.
6 San Francisco News-Call Bulletin, March 29, 1965 page 2 col. 3.
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primarily concerned. First, how widespread is the practice of sterilization
and related practices throughout this country? Second, to what extent is
sterilization legal in the United States?
II
THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF STERILIZATION
The two most popular types of sterilization operations are the vasectomy
for the male and the salpingectomy for the female. Neither are particu-
larly severe.7 The vasectomy is performed by ligating and resecting a small
portion of the vas deferens thus stopping the passage of spermatozoa
into the seminal fluid and so rendering it sterile. The operation is an
extremely simple one. It takes about three to ten minutes, can be per-
formed in a doctor's office with local anesthetic, and the patient can resume
normal activities the same day. The female operation is more serious,
must be performed in a hospital, and requires about a week recovery
time. The salpingectomy entails the severing or tying of the Fallopian
tubes to prevent the ovum from passing to the womb.
There is another simple male operation which is rarely used. It in-
volves cutting the nerve leading to the penis, thus preventing erection.
This, like castration, is sterilization by impotence and obviously affects
the desire and ability to participate in sexual intercourse. The vasectomy
and salpingectomy have no medical effect on the ability to perform
coitus, although there could be a psychological advantage in cases where
desire had been held in check by fear of pregnancy. The mere possibility
that such operations may psychologically increase desire raises questions
as to the effectiveness of sterilization as applied to sexual criminals.
Salpingectomy is at present irreversible, although research to effect
reversibility is continuing. The rate of failure of this operation is about
1 %-2 %. The failure rate on vasectomies is comparable but this operation
is reversible on occasion. There is considerable dispute, however, on the
chances of success. One of the difficulties is the atrophy of the cut ends
of the seminal ducts with their supporting tissues. This explanation, how-
ever, is not entirely satisfactory because there have been cases of success-
ful reversal after twenty years of occluded seminal ducts.9 Some estimates
place the chance of success at 35%-40o%, a some profess a 50% chance
of restoration," and a worker in India has recorded that out of twenty
7 Woodside, STERILZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 192 (1950).
8 St. John-Stevas, LAW AND MORALS 95 (1964).
9 Landman, HUMAN STERILIZATION 95 (1932).
10 Woodside, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 162 (1950).
11 Landman, HUMAN STERILIZATION 233 (1932).
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attempts to reverse vasectomies over a period of eight years, seventeen
were successful.' 2
Figures as to the number of operations performed are not widely
available, nor is it known how many operations are performed but not
reported. An example of the latter is the hypothetical case of a welfare
worker pressuring an indigent recipient who has illegitimate offspring to
undergo an operation or face a cutoff of funds. Compulsory state sterili-
zations categorized by sex during the period 1907-1958 are 24,008 male
and 36,158 female-a total of 60,166."1 Other figures, apparently the
latest available, indicate a cumulative total through 1960 of 61,540.1"
These statistics would not include sterilizations which were not done pur-
suant to specific sterilization statutes. Andrade is a case in point. Nor do
these figures include voluntary operations for contraceptive purposes.
On a state basis, California is the acknowledged leader in this field.
As of 1949 there were 19,042 involuntary sterilizations performed in Cali-
fornia. Virginia ranked second with 5,366 operations, thus showing the
wide disparity between California and other states. 5
III
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT-CURRENT LAWS IN CALIFORNIA
The first recorded sterilization operations were performed in the United
States in 1889." The most common male operation, the vasectomy, was
initiated by Dr. Harry C. Sharp who developed this technique in an
Indian reformatory in 1899. The first proposed legislation was in 1897
in Michigan," but it was Dr. Sharp's state of Indiana which enacted the
world's first sterilization statute in 1907.18 This statute was later de-
clared unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court as violative of due
process in William v. Smith."9 At one time or another thirty-three states
have had sterilization statutes in force."0 Presently thirteen states have
statutes applicable to criminals 2' and twenty-eight have some form of
12 St. John-Stevas, LAW AND MORALS 95 (1964).
13 Id. at 108.
14 Zenoff, Reappraisal of Eugenic Sterilization Laws, 10 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 149 at 168
(1961).
15 Woodside, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 194 (1950).
16Nachsin, Sterilization of Criminals and Mental Defectives in the United States, 11
N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 157 (1955-6).
17 30 Calif. L. Rev. 189 (1941-2).
18 Ind. Acts 1907, ch. 215.
19 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921).
20 St. John-Stevas, LAW AND MORALS 95 (1964).
21 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 738 at 739 (1963-4).
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compulsory sterilization for inmates of state mental institutions.'
California currently has three sterilization statutes in effect. The Wel-
fare and Institutions Code Section 6624 provides for the sterilization of
patients in state hospitals for the mentally ill. The patient must be com-
mitted or admitted to a state hospital and must suffer from any of the
following conditions: (a) mental disease which may have been inherited
and is likely to be transmitted to descendants; (b) mental deficiency,
in any of its various grades; (c) marked departures from normal mental-
ity. There are provisions for notice and procedures for objections. The
notice factor is particularly crucial under due process since many of the
early sterilization cases, as will be discussed, found eugenic statutes con-
stitutionally deficient because of the lack of notice to interested parties.
Although there have been thousands of sterilizations performed since this
statute was enacted in 1913, its constitutionality has never been chal-
lenged.
The same has held true for Section 2670 of the California Penal Code
which was also enacted in 1913. This section provides for the asexualiza-
tion of imprisoned recidivists who have been incarcerated at least twice for
rape or seduction, or at least three times for any other crime or crimes
evidencing that the subject is a moral or sexual degenerate. This section
also includes convicts sentenced for life who exhibit moral or sexual
depravity, whether or not they have been an inmate in a state prison
more than once. This section is referred to in the codes as an "asexualiza-
tion" statute whereas the other two code provisions are labelled "sterili-
zation" statutes. Inferentially, this statute would seem to authorize
castration.
California Penal Code Section 645 provides:
Whenever any person shall be adjudged guilty of carnal abuse of a fe-male person under the age of ten years, the court may, in addition to
such other punishment or confinement as may be imposed, direct an
operation to be performed upon such persons, for the prevention of
procreation.
There is no case law in California or other states on this or similar
statutes and its constitutionality may well depend on whether it is con-
strued to be eugenic, therapeutic, or punitive.
Both this statute and the hardened criminal provision in California
permit sterilization for felony convictions under Superior Court juris-
diction. Yet Miguel Andrade was sterilized pursuant to a Municipal Court
order incidental to conviction for a misdemeanor. Implicitly then, by
22 Association for Voluntary Sterilization, Inc., A Lawyer Speaks on Sterilization (1964).
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virtue of Andrade, Hernandez and People v. Blankenship2" (to be dis-
cussed in the following pages), a sterilization decree is not dependent on
statutory authorization in California and is within the broad discretion-
ary powers of the court.
IV
STERILIZATION STATUTES IN THE COURTS
There are only two United States Supreme Court decisions, Buck v.
Bell,24 and Skinner v. Oklahoma,25 involving sterilization. The Skinner
case was concerned only with the equal protection aspects of applying
the sanction of sterilization under the statute involved and not with
whether, as penal methodology, such was constitutionally prohibited.
Generally, sterilization statutes have been attacked on the following
constitutional grounds: (a) denial of equal protection; (b) ex post facto
legislation and bills of attainder; (c) denial of procedural and substantive
due process; (d) the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
A. Equal Protection
Historically, the mental defective statutes were first attacked. The most
prevalent argument was that there was a denial of equal protection
because the statutes involving the sterilization of inmates in mental
institutions did not apply to those who were equally defective but not
institutionalized, because, for example, they had adequate financial
support. The New York court in Osborn v. Thomson2 followed this
reasoning and found the sterilization of feebleminded and criminal persons
unconstitutional because the law did not apply to those not in state insti-
tutions. The court incidentally expressed the feeling that sterilization
would be an undesirable policy because it would lead to loose morals.
The New Jersey court, in Smith v. Board of Examiners,' felt that
the classification between those institutionalized and those not bore no
reasonable relation to the object of such police regulation and denied the
individual in the class selected the equal protection of the law. Smith was
an institutionalized epileptic but the court held that the statute, to be
acceptable, must include all epileptics. Michigan also found class legis-
lation in contravention to the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause in Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge,28 a matter involving mental
defectives.
23 16 Cal.App.2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936).
24 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
25316 U.S. 525 (1942).
26 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
27 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913).
28 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918).
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The "equal protection" argument was abandoned after it was sum-
marily dismissed by Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell, the single most im-
portant case in the field of sterilization. The Virginia statute there involved
applied only to mental defectives and Carrie Buck was demonstrably
within this classification. She was the daughter of an incompetent, was
incompetent herself, and had given birth to a defective child. It was this
fact situation which led to Justice Holmes' oft-quoted remark:
Three generations of imbeciles are enough."' It was strongly urged in
Buck that the statute was a denial of equal protection since it only applied
to state inmates. The court's answer was that such legislation is not un-
reasonable merely because it does not include the entire class. Further-
more, the practice in Virginia was to free those defective inmates who
were sterilized, thus creating vacancies in the hospitals which would be
filled by those formerly outside the confined class of persons and eventu-
ally creating near egalitarian administration of the sterilization program.
The Buck decision has been severely criticized but it did greatly aid
the "eugenic movement" which was in its heyday in the 1920s and 1930s.
It also served to effectively silence the equal protection argument which
had been advanced in prior cases.30
B. Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder
The only case to seriously consider the ex post facto and bill of at-
tainder objections was Davis v. Berry."' These arguments had been
pressed in Skinner v. State32 but the court did not give them great weight.
In Davis, the defendant had been convicted of two felonies, one before
the statute had been enacted and one afterwards. The act applied to all
criminals twice convicted of a felony. There was no differentiation be-
tween types of felonies. The court held that it was not unconstitutional
as an ex post facto law even though applicable to criminals convicted one
or more times for a felony prior to its enactment. It did hold, however,
that the law was a bill of attainder, reasoning that it inflicted a punish-
ment for past offense by legislative act without a jury trial. And the court
also declared sterilization to be cruel and unusual punishment in the
circumstances presented. Opining that castration belonged to the Dark
29 274 U.S. 200 at 207.
30 Gest, Eugenic Sterilization: Justice Holmes vs. Natural Law, 23 Temp. L. Q. 306, 312
(1949-50).
31216 Fed. 413 (S.D: Iowa 1914), rev'd., 242 U.S. 468 (1916). Case became moot be-
cause of subsequent state legislation passed while case was before Supreme Court. The new act
did not apply to plaintiff.
32 189 Okl. 235, 115 P.2d 123 (1941).
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Ages because of the resultant shame and degradation, the court felt that
sterilization was equally cruel and degrading because the court could
ascertain no substantial distinction between the two operations. Important
to the result, however, was the fact that the act applied indiscriminately
to all felonies including, for example, the breaking of an electric light
bulb.
C. Due Process
Another popular objection to sterilization legislation was that it denied
either substantive or procedural due process. Great attention was given
the type of notice the affected parties received, the opportunities to object,
provisions to supply attorneys for indigents, and the like. These objec-
tions were deemed so important that the governor of Alabama, before
signing a proposed sterilization bill, asked for an advisory opinion as to
its constitutionality from the State Supreme Court. This court in In re
Opinion of the Justices" said that there was a denial of due process
because of the failure to provide for a hearing on notice before a duly
constituted board. The court added, however, that it did not believe it
would be cruel and unusual punishment to sterilize mental defectives.
Section 6624 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code was
implicitly held to be constitutional against an attack of lack of notice in
Garcia v. State Department4 which denied a petition for a writ of Prohi-
bition.
As previously stated, the world's first sterilization statute was held
unconstitutional as a denial of due process by the Indiana court in Wil-
liams v. Smith.35 The proposed operation was enjoined. The basic objec-
tion was that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the experts who
had decided that the operation should be performed.
A North Carolina court found the sole due process issue in Brewer v.
Valk 6 to be: "Can this sterilization be done without notice or hearing.""7
Under the statute it was the duty of the state to sterilize mental defectives
who were not inmates of state institutions upon petition by the next of kin.
Since the statute failed to give notice to the person who was to be sterilized,
it lacked due process.
Although a Utah statute for the sterilization of mental defectives was
found not to be cruel and unusual punishment and not class legislation
33 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935).
34 36 Cal.App.2d 152, 97 P.2d 264 (1939).
35 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921).
36 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933).
37 Id. at 191, 167 S.E. at 640.
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denying equal protection, a Utah court reversed a sterilization order on
due process grounds." The court felt that the defendant was denied due
process because the evidence was not sufficient to show that he was the
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring or that his
welfare would be promoted by sterilization. The court assumed the statute
to be eugenic and therapeutic rather than penal but, "We doubt ... that
even the most ardent advocate of the immutability of the law of heredity
would wish to determine the probable nature of the offspring of Esau
Walton without more facts than appear in the record before us."3
An "established case of hereditary feeblemindedness" 40 was found in
the case of In re Clayton.4 Clayton had two brothers and two sisters; one
brother and one sister were in the same institution for feeblemindedness.
It was held that the statute was within the police power of the state and
that it was not unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
a law providing for the sterilization of mental defectives as a condition
prerequisite to their release from a state institution.
A sterilization order was held to be reasonable and within the police
power of the state in State v. Troutman.42 The court also found that
the order was not cruel and unusual punishment, nor a denial of equal
protection. The family history of the defendant is startling documentation
for the eugenic viewpoint. Troutman was a congenital defective. He was
twenty-six years old with a mental age of four to five years. His mother,
father, five brothers, and six sisters were feebleminded. His mother's
sister had seven children, three of whom were feebleminded. One of these
three had ten children; all ten were feebleminded. Obviously the state of
Idaho had a considerable financial interest in this family.
The California case of People v. Blankenship' is similar in some ways
to In re Andrade.44 The defendant in Blankenship was convicted for
raping a thirteen year old girl and both the defendant and the victim were
syphilitic. There was no evidence that the defendant had infected the girl.
A vasectomy was required as a condition prerequisite to probation and it
was contended that this condition was unreasonable. The court, however,
felt that the state was certainly interested in preventing the contamination
of its citizens by venereal disease.
38 Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921 (1929).
39 Id. at 89, 276 Pac. at 925.
40 120 Neb. 680, 682, 234 N.W. 630, 632 (1931).
41 In re Clayton, supra note 40.
42 50 Idaho 673, 299 Pac. 668 (1931).
43 16 Cal.App.2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936).
44 In re Andrade, 380 U.S. 953 (1965).
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However, as the trial court very properly observed, it was not so much
concerned with curing the disease with which appellant was afflicted as
it was with preventing appellant from transmitting the disease to his
possible posterity. If reproduction is desirable to the end that the race
shall continue it is equally desirable that the race shall be a healthy
race and not one whose members are afflicted by a loathsome and de-
bilitating disease.45
Obviously this case is different from Andrade. The crime of rape is con-
siderably more aggravated than that of failure to support, and moreover,
the defendant was infected with a "loathsome" disease. Yet the cases are
similar in that both required sterilization as a condition of probation.
Another case where a sterilization order was made under the dis-
cretionary powers of the court without implied or express statutory
authorization is the recent Ohio Probate Court decision, In re Simpson."'
The judge ordered an eighteen year old mentally defective girl to undergo
a salpingectomy even though as probate judge his jurisdiction over her
was only temporary. The court found authority from the fact that the
probate court had the plenary power at law and equity to fully dispose
of any matter properly before it. The institutions in Ohio were over-
crowded and the law provided that when such was the case the probate
judge shall take such action and make such order as he deems necessary
to provide for the detention, supervision, care and maintenance of a
feebleminded person. The court cited the conditions of the institutions
and felt that due to the promiscuity of the girl it was likely that she
would become pregnant before she could be committed and segregated
from society. The court also cited a case from the Circuit Court of Balti-
more, Maryland, which allegedly stated, in an unpublished memorandum
opinion, that a sterilization order could be made under the general equity
powers of the court. The Ohio court also felt that the operation was neces-
sary to the health and welfare of the girl.
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The general judicial attitude expressed toward the issue of cruel and
unusual punishment has been one of avoidance. The tendency has been
to construe these laws as non-punitive, thus negating the need for consider-
ation of cruel and unusual punishment. Of course, even where it is con-
sidered that the statute is punitive, there is disagreement as to whether
this is cruel and/or unusual. A case illustrative of this point is Smith v.
Command.47 Smith was a sixteen year old defective confined to a state
45 16 Cal.App. 2d 606, 609, 61 P.2d 352, 355 (1936).
46 180 Ohio 2d 282, 180 N.E.2d 206 (1962).
47 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925).
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home. His father, with his mother's consent, filed a petition to have him
sterilized. The statute provided for a full hearing as to the history of the
person, the probability of defective offspring, etc. The court took judicial
notice that: "Biological science has definitely demonstrated that feeble-
mindedness is hereditary."48 It held that there was no element of punish-
ment in the sterilization of a mental defective (a common viewpoint) and
therefore the ban against cruel and unusual punishments was not appli-
cable. The court implied that a vasectomy would not be cruel and unusual
because the operation only takes about three minutes, there is no anes-
thetic, and the subject returns to work immediately thereafter. The court
concluded that the "great weight of authority supports the right of the
state in the exercise of its police powers to enact reasonable legislation
for the sexual sterilization of certain natural classes of mental defectives
and degenerates."49
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."5 Originally, this amendment
applied only to the federal government, but now the ban against such
punishments is applicable to the states. Robinson v. State of California5
could be authority for striking down any punishment which offends due
process. The majority of the United States Supreme Court in that decision
held that the California law, which made the "status" of narcotic addiction
a criminal offense for which the offender could be prosecuted any time
prior to his reformation, inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Concurring, Mr. Justice Douglas'
emotive definition of the function of the Eighth Amendment is interesting
when placed in a sterilization context: "The Eighth Amendment expresses
the revulsion of civilized man against barbarous acts-the cry of horror
against man's inhumanity to his fellow man."'52
Although the death penalty does not fall within the prohibited cate-
gory, cruel and unusual punishment ". . . was, doubtless, intended to
prohibit the barbarities of quartering, hanging in chains, castration, etc."5"
The punishment of cadena (a minimum of twelve years and one day at
hard labor while chained at both ankles and wrists) was held by the
Supreme Court in Weems v. United States to be cruel and unusual as
48 Id. at 414, 204 N.W. at 141.
49 Id. at 422, 204 N.W. at 144.
50 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.
51370 U.S. 660 (1962).
52 Id. at 676.
53 Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 298, 302 (1872).
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applied to a person convicted of falsifying public documents. 54 It was
therein ruled that the punishment for a crime should be related to the
gravity of the offense. Recently, a Delaware court has held that whipping,
per se, was not cruel and unusual, although the case was remanded to
determine if it was proscribed under the facts of the case. 5
The most important case to the effect that sterilization is not cruel is
State v. Feilen.56 The issue there was whether a vasectomy operation vio-
lated the state constitutional ban against "cruel" punishments. There was
no provision in the Washington Constitution with respect to "unusual"
punishments. It was held that vasectomy could not be judicially deter-
mined to be cruel where sentence required that it be carefully and skillfully
performed and where there was no showing that it was attended with any
marked degree of physical torture, suffering, or pain. The court specifically
concluded that vasectomy is "... less serious than the extraction of a
tooth." 7 The court accepted the argument that death was not a cruel
penalty and therefore anything less than death was acceptable. The de-
fendant had been convicted for the rape of a female under the age of ten-
a situation also covered by California Penal Code §645 which authorizes
sterilization at the judge's discretion.
A federal court in Mickel v. Henricks58 found that a vasectomy for
an epileptic convicted of rape was cruel and unusual punishment. There
was no attempt by the state to support the sterilization on the basis of the
promotion of general welfare and the court took judicial notice that "as
a preventive of this crime vasectomy is without effect." 9 The court's basic
reason is found in the following excerpt:
Vasectomy in itself is not cruel; it is no more cruel than branding, the
amputation of a finger, the slitting of a tongue, or the cutting off of anear; but, when resorted to as punishment, it is ignominious and degrad-
ing, and in that sense cruel. Certainly it would be unusual in Nevada.
... Reformation of the criminal is a wise and humane purpose of pun-ishment, to be disregarded only when the death penalty is inflicted. It
needs no argument to establish the proposition that degrading andhumiliating punishment is not conducive to the resumption of upright
and self respecting life .... It will not do to argue that, inasmuch asthe death penalty may be inflicted for this crime, vasectomy, or anyother similar mutilation of the body, cannot be regarded as cruel, be-
cause the greater includes the less.6"
54 21'/U.S. 349 (1910).
55 Cannon v. State of Delaware, 196 A.2d 399 (1963).
56 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912).
57 Id. at 69, 126 Pac. at 77.
58 262 Fed. 687 (D.Nev. 1918).
59 Id. at 688.
60 ld. at 690.
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The court distinguished the case from State v. Feilen6' in the difference
between the Washington and Nevada constitutions. Nevada forbade
punishments which were "cruel or unusual" whereas Washington pro-
scribed only the "cruel." Therefore it was enough for the court to find
under Nevada law that the operation was "unusual," irrespective of
whether it was also cruel. The Eighth Amendment applies to punishments
which are both cruel and unusual and it is doubtful that a penalty which
was novel but not cruel would be prohibited. Furthermore under the laws
of other states the fact that the defendant was an epileptic would have
been sufficient reason to sterilize him under the mental defective statutes.
V
JUSTIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS TO INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION
Often the moral as well as the legal justification for sterilization depends
on the validity of the scientific premise that undesirable traits are
inheritable. "Since Galton first published his studies in heredity some
eighty years ago, the importance of hereditary factors in the transmission
of mental and physical abnormality has been established without scientific
doubt."62 But most defective children come from normal parents who are
carriers of the defects but not defective themselves. ". . . (the) greatest
eugenic danger to posterity lay not in the reproduction of a comparatively
small number of certified insane and defective, but in that much larger
group of subnormal persons, most of them likely to be 'carriers' of
defect."63
While hereditary characteristics are easily demonstrated in cases of
feeblemindedness, the inheritability of criminal attributes is difficult to
prove. Although thirteen states have sterilization statutes applicable to
criminals,64 there is no concrete evidence that any criminal trait is likely
to be passed on to succeeding generations. Furthermore, it has been
forceably argued that a sterilization operation will increase the chance of
future criminal behavior as the sex criminal can operate without fear of
impregnating the victim.
This argument has more weight in cases of statutory rape wherein
the female is a consenting partner. Often these cases are prosecuted only
because of the girl's parents who became aware of the "rape" only after
their daughter became pregnant. It follows that if this type of man were
61 70 Wash. 65,126 Pac. 75 (1912).
62 Woodside, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 23 (1950).
63 Id. at I10.
64 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 738 at 739 (1963-4).
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sterilized he would, in the majority of instances, escape detection. Since
a vasectomy does not affect the sexual desire, the argument is that if it
does not effectively operate as a deterrent, and cannot be scientifically
shown to be eugenic, it serves no purpose and any discussion of whether
it encourages crime is moot.
Another argument in favor of these laws is that the sterilization of
habitual criminals would tend to prevent children from being brought up
in a criminal environment. The segregation of the criminal from society,
however, seems to accomplish the same end. The only alternative motive
would be that these laws are for the protection of society, particularly
that portion of society likely to be victimized by the sex criminal. This
would apply especially in states which outlaw abortions for rape victims.
However this position is not supported by any authority.
The most highly charged emotional opposition is based on the history
of sterilization in Nazi Germany as a measure of race extermination. It is
feared that such programs could be similarly used in this country to
persecute a minority, though statistics available on races sterilized do not
bear this out.65 There is also the generalized moral objection that sterili-
zation encourages promiscuity and immoral behavior.
Significant opposition to sterilization has also been presented by
representatives of organized religions. For example, one publication has
stated the Catholic position as follows:
The Catholic Church condemns all forms of direct sterilization, whether
compulsory or voluntary . . (the) procreative faculty is one of man's
most important endowments and save in cases of grave necessity he is
not free to do away with it at will .... Catholic theologians recognize
that therapeutic sterilization is morally justified if it is the only means
of securing the welfare of the body as a whole .... Sterilization in cir-
cumstances where a woman's health would be gravely endangered by
a future pregnancy would not, however, be justified since there is
always the alternative of refraining from sexual intercourse.66
Furthermore, where the law provides for compulsory sterilization of
a person who is, for example, a Catholic, a strong argument could be
drafted on the basis of the First Amendment. Sterilization would seem,
arguably, to be an infringement of the free exercise of religion. If one
believed that the procreative faculty is "one of man's most important
endowments" even to the extent that one would be willing to eschew
participation in sexual intercourse as the only alternative to sterilization,
compulsory sterilization might be an infringement of his religious beliefs
as guaranteed by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. On the
65 Woodside, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 192 (1950).
66 St. John-Stevas, LAw AND MORALS 108 (1964).
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other hand, to allow exception to one whose religion condemned sterili-
zation may violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 7
It is enough for the purposes of this discussion that the religious objections
are not easily swept aside.
VI
STERILIZATION PRACTICES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
The United States is not the only country in which sterilization has
been practiced. As previously mentioned, Nazi Germany had a program
of enforced sterilization based on their racial philosophy. The German
Sterilization Law of 1933 had sanctioned approximately 225,000 opera-
tions by 1937." There are also such laws in Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Finland, Alberta (Canada), British Columbia (Canada), Vaud (Switzer-
land), Vera Cruz (Mexico), and Japan.69
Perhaps the most startling to the American mind is the Denmark
law which permits the castration of sexual offenders.7" Under the Danish
law, which has been in effect since 1927, permission may be granted by
the Minister of Justice to castrate a person when the Medico-Legal
Council has declared that the sexual urges of such person render him
likely to commit sexual offenses which make him dangerous to the general
public and personally cause him great mental suffering. A sexual crime
is defined as any crime which is traceable to sexual attributes. This
includes any crime committed for the purpose of gain, such as theft, and
it even includes the crime of arson-an act purportedly related to sexual
gratification. The Danish view the law as therapeutic and voluntary,
and the usual practice is to release a prisoner from confinement after a
castration operation. This is considered more humane than long incar-
ceration. As of 1957 some 600 persons had been castrated under this
law.71
Perhaps the most significant result of the Danish experience has been
the dramatic reduction of recidivism. While it seems obvious that one
who has been castrated is not likely to embark on a career of rape or
similar offenses, the results indicate that the castrated criminal is not
67 Donnici, Government Encouragement of Religious Ideology, 13 J.Pub. Law 16
(1964). Compare Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
68 Woodside, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 24 (1950).
69 Bartholemew, Legal Implications oj Voluntary Sterilization Operations, 2 M.U.L.R.
77 (1959-60).
70 Le Maire, Danish Experiences Regarding the Castration of Sexual Offenders, 47 J.
Crim. L., C.&P.S. 294 (1956-7).
71 Ibid.
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likely to commit further crimes of any nature. This Danish experience
has led a member of English Parliament to ask for a British inquiry.72
Japan is a country which is illustrative of current trends. As opposed
to compulsory sterilizations for eugenic reasons, voluntary sterilization
is being strongly urged as a method of birth control. Although Japan is
well known for the ease with which an abortion is obtainable, it is en-
deavoring to change this image. It is de-emphasizing its permissive abor-
tion laws and vigorously stressing contraceptive sterilization as being
preferable to abortion as a means of population control. Both were legal-
ized with the Eugenic Protection Law of 1948."3
India and other countries suffering from over-population urge con-
traceptive sterilization. Officials in Madras, India pay a man 30 rupees
to become sterilized.74
VII
VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
While involuntary sterilization in the United States is declining (only
about 500 such operations were performed last year75), and eugenic
sterilization is no longer a significant social theory in this country, volun-
tary sterilization is one of the most popular (in terms of number per-
formed) operations in the United States. It is estimated by the Association
for Voluntary Sterilization, Inc. that 100,000 Americans choose this
method of birth control each year.76
At the present time there are only three states, Connecticut, Kansas
and Utah which have legislation regarding voluntary sterilization.77 These
statutes permit voluntary sterilization only in cases of medical necessity.
It is predictable that "medical necessity" will be the criterion of future
72 San Francisco Chronicle, April 4, 1965 page 7 col. 1, "Castration For Sex Criminals-
British Inquiry."
73 Guttmacher, How Births Can Be Controlled, National Review 642 (July 27, 1965).
74 Ibid.
75 Letter from Association For Voluntary Sterilization, Inc., 515 Madison Avenue, New
York, New York 10022, on file at U.S.F. Law Review office.
76 Ibid. The Association for Voluntary Sterilization, Inc., whose purpose is "to make
known the benefits of voluntary sterilization in the solution of family and population prob-
lems," is now the leading organization in this field.
77 General Statutes of Connecticut 53-33; Kansas Statutes Annotated 76-155; Utah
Code Annotated 64-10-12. As representative, see General Statutes of Connecticut 53-33:
"Except as authorized by section 17-19, any person who performs, encourages, assists in or
otherwise promotes the performance of either of the operations described in said section, for
the purpose of destroying the power to procreate the human species, or any person who
knowingly permits either of such operations to be performed upon such person, unless the
same is a medical necessity, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned
not more than five years or both."
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laws on sterilization, just as it is in the fields of contraception and
abortion.
Under the recent Supreme Court case of Griswold v. State of Connec-
ticut," legislation prohibiting voluntary sterilization except in cases of
medical necessity could be unconstitutional. This case involved the contra-
ceptive laws of Connecticut which have been the subject of extensive
litigation. On June 7, 1965 Mr. Justice Douglas writing for a majority of
the court in Griswold declared this legislation unconstitutional. There was
wide agreement that these laws should be struck down, but there was some
dispute as to what should be the constitutional basis for the decision. Jus-
tice Douglas used the penumbra theory of rights: those rights which ema-
nate from the Bill of Rights and form a metaphorical umbrella protecting
the liberties of the citizens from storms which would erode these rights.
Using Griswold as authority, it may be unconstitutional to deny some-
one, especially marital partners, voluntary sterilization (independent of
medical necessity) as a means of contraception. It is obviously difficult to
show medical necessity in such cases. Assuming that the wife cannot have
any more children without risking her life and possibly that of the baby,
there would be a medical necessity for her to be sterilized since steriliza-
tion is more reliable than birth control. Conceivably, however, the wife
would be called upon to prove that her condition was permanent and this
might be difficult to definitely prove. Moreover, since vasectomy is a far
easier and less expensive operation, the husband in such a situation may
seek the operation. But does the medical necessity which exists as to the
wife exist as to him?
Furthermore, the state interest would be virtually the same under a
voluntary sterilization statute as it was in the Griswold case. The state
has slight interest in the fecundity of parents. The state's interest in pre-
venting illicit sex would have only the most tenuous connections with a
statute forbidding voluntary sterilization of a married person. The right
of privacy which was held to extend over a married couple's decision to
use contraceptives could logically be extended over their choice of contra-
ceptive operations. The distinctions are not great, and it would seem that
if the umbrella of privacy covers one it should cover the other. Granted
that sterilization is likely to be permanent, there should be no legal pro-
hibition against an adult with all of his mental faculties exercising his
freedom of choice over his method of family planning. The right to pro-
create presumably includes the right not to procreate if that is one's
choice. It is a harsh sanction to deem one who exercises this right a felon.
78 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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VIII
CONCLUSIONS
In general, statutes providing for the sterilization of persons with un-
desirable traits which can be demonstrated to be inheritable by a med-
ical authority and which provide for notice, counsel for indigents, etc. are
constitutional. Statutes which are so vaguely worded as to implicitly allow
castration and like operations are at best suspect. A case can be made
against statutes providing for criminal sanctions for those who have oper-
ations without the requisite medical necessity.79 Perhaps the best position
a state may take on voluntary sterilization is the position taken by 47
states, to wit, no position. Whether contraceptive sterilization is a good
policy is debatable, but it is hardly felonious.
For pragmatic reasons compulsory sterilization of criminals should
be abolished. Nothing is accomplished. Sterilization will not prevent Nancy
Hernandez from smoking marijuana. Nor will it prevent Miguel Andrade
from failing to support his children. While the sterilization of hardened
criminals is no longer in vogue, there is a frightening tenor in these two
recent cases. Sterilization is being used to exhibit the people's displeasure
over the payment of welfare funds for the support of illegitimate chil-
dren. In a sense Andrade and Mrs. Hernandez were ordered punished
because they had illegitimate children. It is submitted that two factors
caused the Municipal Court to order Mrs. Hernandez's sterilization as a
condition of probation: (1) that there was an illegitimate child; (2) that
public funds were disbursed for the support of the child. These factors
were also present in the Andrade case. Whatever the social opprobrium
attendant to the conduct of these parties, they should be punished only
for the crime with which they are charged. There must be a significant
relationship between the punishment and the crime charged. In Andrade
the relationship was tenuous; in Hernandez it was non-existent.
To say that compulsory sterilization (and sterilization as a condition
of probation is to all intents and purposes compulsory) of criminals
should be abolished for pragmatic reasons is not to say that it is uncon-
stitutional. Whether or not it works is not a constitutional consideration.
The authority indicates it is constitutional.
Sterilization is as controversial now as it ever was. It is only'hoped
that this discussion will add somewhat to the reader's perspective as he
girds for the fray.
Richard W. Millar
79 See, for example, the statutes mentioned in note 77, supra.
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